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We introduce a new conservative test for quantifying the consistency of two or more datasets.
The test is based on the Bayesian answer to the question, “How much more probable is it that
all my data were generated from the same model system than if each dataset were generated from
an independent set of model parameters?”. We make explicit the connection between evidence
ratios and the differences in peak chi-squared values, the latter of which are more widely used and
more cheaply calculated. Calculating evidence ratios for three cosmological datasets (recent CMB
data (WMAP, ACBAR, CBI, VSA), SDSS and the most recent SNe Type 1A data) we find that
concordance is favoured and the tightening of constraints on cosmological parameters is indeed
justified.
PACS numbers: 98.80.Cq
I. INTRODUCTION
The apparent mutual agreement of a wide range of
cosmological observations has led to the current climate
of “concordance” in cosmology [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
The practice of combining independent datasets, by the
multiplication of their associated likelihood functions, in
order to increase the precision of the parameters of the
world model is now standard, but quantitative consis-
tency checking is emphasised to a much lesser degree.
As all physicists will agree, accurate cosmology is prefer-
able to precision cosmology, and it is this that motivates
this short communication.
The purpose of this work is to demonstrate one appli-
cation of Bayesian model selection, that of checking that
the far simpler model of a universal set of parameters for
modeling all datasets is justified by the data themselves:
in doing so we make the connection between the Bayesian
formulation of the problem and the pragmatic approach
taken at much lower computational cost by the experi-
mental community. In this work we show that, as is so
often the case, the standard approach is justified on the
grounds of common sense, and demonstrate the reduc-
tion of this common sense to calculation via probability
theory.
As usual, the route to model selection is via the
Bayesian evidence. The evidence for a model H from data
d is just the probability Pr(d|H), and can be calculated
in principle by marginalising the unnormalised posterior
probability distribution function over all M parameters
θ in the model:
Pr(d|H) =
∫
Pr(d|θ,H)Pr(θ|H) dMθ. (1)
In practice, calculating this integral is rarely feasible, but
other techniques exist to provide estimates of the evi-
dence [see, for example, 9]. More detailed introductions
to the evidence and its central role in the problem of
model selection are available elsewhere [10, 11] – here
we make the general remarks that the evidence increases
sharply with increasing goodness-of-fit, and decreases
with increasing model complexity (quantifying the princi-
ple of Occam’s razor). We show later explicitly how these
two aspects come to the surface and, for the specific case
of Gaussian measurement errors, result in model selec-
tion proceeding by the comparison of differences in the
ubiquitous chi-squared statistic with an “Occam” factor
which takes the form of an effective number of parame-
ters. The more general approach advocated here is ap-
plicable to any likelihood functions (Pr(d|θ,H)), not just
those having Gaussian form, and takes into account the
full extent of the pdf’s involved. It is of course also sensi-
tive to the parameters’ prior pdf (Pr(θ|H)): broader pri-
ors represent more complex models and so naturally give
lower evidence values. Evidence is the natural tool for
comparing datasets in this way: it enables us to quantify
such questions as “Is the mismatch between two experi-
ments large enough to warrant investigation into possible
sources of systematics or new physics?”
The simplest model for all the cosmological data in
hand is that they provide information on the same set of
cosmological parameters: this is the standard assumption
made in all the joint analyses to date. Let H0 represent
the hypothesis that “there is one set of parameters that
describes our cosmological model.” In other words, we
believe that we understand both cosmology and our ex-
periments to the extent that there should be no further
freedom beyond the parameters specified. However, if
we are interested in accuracy as well as precision then we
should take care to allow for systematic differences be-
2tween datasets: the most extreme case would be the one
where the observations were in such strong disagreement
that they appeared to give conflicting measurements of
all the model parameters. In this case one could consider
the hypothesis H1 that “there is a different set of param-
eters for modeling each dataset.” The conservatism of
such a model comparison exercise is readily apparent: the
large increase in model complexity incurred when mov-
ing from H0 to H1 means that the joint analysis is intrin-
sically more favourable. This means that any result in
favour of H1 may be taken as a clear indication of discord
between the two experiments. Note also that this test is
easily done given that the evidence values will have been
calculated for alternative purposes, such as comparing
two physical models in the light of each dataset alone.
For checking dataset consistency then the quantity we
should calculate is the ratio of probabilities that each
model is correct, given the data:
Pr(H0|d)
Pr(H1|d) =
Pr(d|H0)
Pr(d|H1) ·
Pr(H0)
Pr(H1)
(2)
The calculable part of Equation 2 is the evidence ratio
R =
Pr(d|H0)
Pr(d|H1)
=
Pr(d|H0)∏
i Pr(di|H1)
(3)
where in the second line we have assumed that the indi-
vidual datasets di under analysis are independent. (The
evidence integral factors out since the independent likeli-
hoods do, and also because each likelihood depends only
on its own subset of parameters.) Interpretation of this
evidence ratio is aided by Equation 2: for statement H0
to be more likely to be true than statement H1, the prod-
uct of R and the prior probability ratio must be greater
than one. Suppose that an evidence ratio R of 0.1 were
found: the dataset combination (H0) can still be justi-
fied, but only if you are willing to take odds of ten to one
on there being no significant systematic errors in the sys-
tem. Blindly multiplying N likelihoods together results,
in general and approximately, in factors of improvement
in precision of
√
N : the evidence ratio gives an indica-
tion of whether or not this improvement is justified, in
the form of an odds ratio (which enforces honesty through
the threat of bankruptcy).
Other criteria besides evidence have been used to com-
pare different models. Recently [12] have proposed the
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria to carry out
cosmological model selection. These criteria are approx-
imations to the full Bayesian evidence under rather re-
strictive assumptions and thus fall under the same frame-
work. The posterior Bayes factors proposed by [13] and
also discussed in [14] can be used as an alternative to ev-
idence. This quantity is the Bayesian evidence with the
prior set to the posterior and can be readily estimated as
an average likelihood of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
chains. It has some desirable properties, such as no prior
dependence in the limit of prior enclosing the entire vol-
ume of posterior. However, it has no simple interpre-
tation within Bayesian framework and will thus not be
discussed in this paper. The use of the evidence itself
as a model selection tool has been growing in cosmology
[see e.g. 15, 16, 17, 18]. Using evidence to check dataset
consistency has received much less attention. Applica-
tion to a particular problem of CMB map contamination
can be found in [16]. In this work we construct a much
more general approach that can be applied to any set-
ting in which a given model is tested against more than
one dataset. The price one has to pay for this general-
ity is that we are relatively insensitive to any particular
inconsistency. We also aim to provide a short tutorial, es-
tablishing the connection with the more conventional χ2
statistics, followed by a simple analysis of current state-
of-the-art experiments.
II. CONNECTION TO χ2 ANALYSIS
Consider a general likelihood function of some model
parameter vector x, which can be (for reasons that will
become apparent in a moment) rewritten as
L(x) = LmaxLˆ(x), (4)
where Lmax is the likelihood at the most likely point in
the parameter space and the dimensionless function Lˆ
contains all the likelihood shape information. Assuming
a uniform prior spanning between −p and p in each di-
rection, where p is large enough to encompass all region
of high likelihood, gives the approximate evidence
E˜ ≈ Lmax
∫
LˆdMx
(2p)M
, (5)
where M is the number of parameters in the model. If
we identify the numerator of the above fraction with the
volume associated with the likelihood VL, and the de-
nominator with the available prior volume Vpi , we have
logE = log
(
VL
Vpi
)
+ logLmax. (6)
All the details of the overlap between prior and likelihood
is contained with in the volume ratio, whereas the max-
imum likelihood value specifies the goodness-of-fit. Ex-
cept when the posterior pdf’s take simple analytic forms,
this volume factor must be calculated numerically and of
course takes up much of the effort in the evidence calcu-
lation.
In the case where the measurement errors are Gaus-
sian, we can write the evidence ratio used in this work
in terms of the best-fit chi-squared values that may be
calculated during an analysis. It can be shown that
logR = log
(
V12Vpi
V1V2
)
− 1
2
∆χˆ2, (7)
3where ∆χˆ2 = χˆ2
12
− (χˆ2
1
+ χˆ2
2
). Defined this way, ∆χˆ2 is
always positive (the goodness-of-fit cannot decrease with
the addition of the extra parameters) and we see that the
borderline case of logR = 0 corresponds to the difference
in chi-squared between the two individual analyses and
the joint fit being equal to an effective number of param-
eters (difference in number of degrees of freedom) given
by the logarithm of the volume factor.
Returning to the general case, if we retain the assump-
tion of a broad uniform prior, and if the likelihoods are
well approximated by multivariate Gaussians, then the
volume factor can be calculated analytically: in this case
the ith likelihood can be written as
Li ≈ Lˆi exp
[
−1
2
(x− xˆi)TF−1i (x− xˆi)
]
, (8)
where Fi is the Fisher matrix. This gives, for the likeli-
hood volumes,
Vi = (2pi)
M/2 |Fi|1/2 . (9)
In the joint analysis, combining two Gaussian likelihoods
results in a new Gaussian, centred at a correctly weighted
mean of positions, but whose shape is given simply by
Lˆ12 = exp
[
−1
2
(x− xˆi)T (F1 + F2)−1 (x− xˆi)
]
, (10)
and therefore
V12 = (2pi)
M/2 |F1 + F2|1/2 . (11)
Note that in this case, due to the high symmetry of
the Gaussian approximation, the overlap integral V12 is
independent of the distance between best fitting points.
Therefore using ∆χ2 as a proxy for the Bayesian evidence
change is valid when the Gaussian approximation to the
posterior is a good one. In the simple case where F1 = F2
(a parallel degeneracy) and Vpi = (2p)
M again, the log
evidence becomes:
logR =
1
2
(
M log
[
4
pi
p2
|F |1/M
]
−∆χ2
)
. (12)
The log term is typically of the order of unity: |F |1/M
is the geometrical average of the principal variances and
hence p2|F |−1/M is the square of the ratio of the prior
width to the characteristic likelihood width. Hence we re-
cover the frequentist rule of thumb that the increase in χ2
is justified if the number of parameters drops by roughly
the same number. However the evidence considerations
above allow this rule to be calibrated to take into account
both the prior information supplied and the (potentially
complex) shape of the likelihoods; in general, V12 is not
independent of the individual peak positions, and so the
simple ∆χˆ2 procedure does not propagate all the infor-
mation contained within the likelihood functions.
TABLE I: The priors assumed for the cosmological model
considered in this paper. The notation (a, b) for parameter x
denotes a top-hat prior in the range a < x < b
Basic parameter Prior
ωb (0.005, 0.05)
ωdm (0.01, 0.4)
Ωk (−0.3, 0.3)
h (0.4, 0.9)
ns (0.8, 1.2)
τ (0.01, 0.7)
log 1010As (1, 5)
III. COMPARING COSMOLOGICAL DATASETS
A. Datasets and method
We use a version of the CosmoMC software package [14],
modified to calculate evidence by the thermodynamic in-
tegration method. We obtain consistent results using two
different methods to calculate the evidence reliably: the
error on the log evidence differences is conservatively es-
timated to be of the order of unity. The details of the
evidence calculation method is presented elsewhere [19].
We have chosen three datasets for comparison:
• CMB: We use the “standard” selection of CMB
experiments: the WMAP data [20] together with
latest VSA [21], CBI [3] and ACBAR data [22].
We also used a modified version of the likelihood
code that correctly accounts for the largest WMAP
scales [23]
• SN: We use the Riess et al. (2004) SN data. We use
both “gold” and “silver” datasets. We implemented
our likelihood code and checked that it gives results
consistent with Riess et al.
• SDSS: Finally we use large scale power spec-
trum measurements from the SDSS experiment
[24, 25, 26]. We used the likelihood code by
Tegmark [5] adapted for CosmoMC by Samuel Leach
(private communication).
We investigate a 7-parameter cosmological model. In
Table I we show the uniform priors assumed for the pa-
rameters of our model. We take our priors to be com-
paratively broad to approximate the state of ignorance
we may have been in before any of the three experiments
were performed. This has the effect of giving the data as
much “freedom” as possible, and correspondingly making
the evidence test somewhat conservative.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Table II we give the values of R for various combina-
tions of datasets under discussion. We do not detect any
4TABLE II: The logarithm of R for various combinations of
datasets. See text for further discussion.
Dataset combination log R
CMB – SDSS 0.23
SDSS – SN 1.5
SN – CMB 1.6
CMB – SDSS – SN 4.5
discrepancy between datasets: all combinations of the
datasets weakly favour H0. In the last line of the table II
we report on the value of R for all experiments combined.
In principle, it is possible to have three experiments be
pair-wise consistent with each other, but not when all
combined together (imagine, for example three degener-
acy lines forming a triangle). Comfortingly enough, the
three-way evidence test also abrogates H1 and due to a
large number of extra parameters (i.e. twice as many as
in other datasets) it has also a more positive detection of
concordance.
We have illustrated our methodology with application
to real cosmological data. As expected, the data are con-
cordant: any obvious conflict in the data would likely
have been noticed using the “chi by eye” methods em-
ployed to date. However, should such discrepancies occur
in the future it is imperative to have a method to quan-
tify these discrepancies in the most general settings where
Gaussianity cannot be assumed and ever more complex
parameter spaces are to be dealt with.
A value of R less than unity (logR < 0) is a sign that
we should investigate the mismatch between datasets fur-
ther. This can be done by exploring more focussed mod-
els, either with new cosmological parameters (if the ex-
periments are reckoned to be well-understood), or with
additional nuisance parameters that quantify the possible
systematic errors in the data. Disentangling the degen-
eracy between new physics and systematic error can only
be done if the additional parameters come with fresh in-
formation encoded in their prior pdf: this information
is then folded into the evidence ratio, providing the cru-
cial difference between this methodology and any method
relying on goodness-of-fit alone.
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